



INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

**REPORT OF THE SIXTH MEETING OF THE
ANNUAL SAFETY REPORT GROUP**

(ASRG/6)

(Virtual Meeting, 2 October 2024)

The views expressed in this Report should be taken as those of the Regional Aviation Safety Group and not of the Organization. This Report will, however, be submitted to the ICAO Council and any formal action taken will be published in due course as a Supplement to the Report.

Approved by the Meeting
and published by authority of the Secretary General

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of ICAO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontier or boundaries.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PART I - HISTORY OF THE MEETING	
1. Place and Duration.....	1
2. Opening.....	1
3. Attendance	1
4. Officers and Secretariat.....	1
5. Language.....	1
6. Agenda.....	1
7. Conclusions and Decisions - Definition.....	2
8. List of Draft Conclusions and Draft Decisions	2
PART II - REPORT ON AGENDA ITEMS	
Report on Agenda Item 1.....	1-1
Report on Agenda Item 2.....	2-5
Report on Agenda Item 3.....	3-1
APPENDICES	
Appendix 2A-2E	
ATTACHMENT	
List of Participants	Attachment A

PART I – HISTORY OF THE MEETING

1. PLACE AND DURATION

1.1 The Sixth Meeting of the Annual Safety Report Group (ASRG/6) was held virtually, on 2 October 2024, using MS Teams.

2. OPENING

2.1 The meeting was opened by Mr. Mashhor Alblowi, Regional Officer, Flight Safety who welcomed all participants and thanked them for participating and supporting the ASRG.

2.2 The meeting was also opened by Mr. Erdal Yesilbas, SSP Coordinator, Qatar who welcomed the participants and thanked them for joining this Teleconference and for their continuous support.

2.3 Mr. Erdal encouraged states to support the ASRG in developing the MID-ASR by sharing safety information and data analysis.

2.4 Mr. Erdal highlighted that the main objective of the ASRG is to gather and analyze the safety information, identify the risk category focus/key areas and emerging issues; and identify root causes and contributing factors, to support the SEIG in the development of mitigation measures.

2.5 He also thanked all the participants for their attendance and wished the meeting every success in its deliberations.

3. ATTENDANCE

3.1 The meeting was attended by a total of Forty-six (46) participants from nine (9) States (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and USA) and Two (2) Organizations (Boeing and IATA). The list of participants is at **Attachment A**.

4. OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAT

4.1 The meeting was chaired by Vice-Chairperson Mr. Erdal Yesilbas, SSP Coordinator, Qatar.

4.2 Mr. Mohamed Chakib, RO/SAF-IMP was the Secretary of the meeting.

5. LANGUAGE

5.1 Discussions were conducted in English and documentation was issued in English.

6. AGENDA

6.1 The following Agenda was adopted:

Agenda Item 1: Adoption of the Provisional Agenda

Agenda Item 2: Regional Performance Framework for Safety

Agenda Item 3: Future Work Programme

Agenda Item 4: Any other Business

7. CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS – DEFINITION

7.1 The RASG-MID records its actions in the form of Conclusions and Decisions with the following significance:

- a) **Conclusions** deal with matters that, according to the Group's terms of reference, merit directly the attention of States and its stakeholders/partners, or on which further action will be initiated by the Secretary in accordance with established procedures; and
- b) **Decisions** relate solely to matters dealing with the internal working arrangements of the Group and its subsidiary bodies.

8. LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/1: SHARING OF SAFETY DATA ANALYSIS

PART II: REPORT ON AGENDA ITEMS**REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 1: ADOPTION OF THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA**

- 1.1 The subject was addressed in WP/1 presented by the Secretariat.
- 1.2 The meeting reviewed and adopted the Agenda as at paragraph 6 of the History of the Meeting

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 2: REGIONAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE***PIRG/RASG and RASG-MID/11 Conclusions and Decisions***

2.1 The subject was addressed in WP/2 by the secretariat. The meeting noted the status on the outcome of the RASG-MID/11 and PIRG/RASG meeting related to the ASRG and the follow-up actions taken by concerned parties as at **Appendices 2A and 2B** respectively.

MID Region Safety Priorities

2.2 The subject was addressed in WP/3 and PPT/1 presented by the secretariat. The meeting reviewed the Draft version of the 13th MID-ASR. Based on the analysis of the reactive and proactive safety information for the period 2019-2023 provided by ICAO, IATA and the MID Region States for the period 2019 – 2023. The safety priorities defined for the MID Region are:

Regional Operational Safety Risks

1. Loss of Control Inflight - (LOC-I);
2. Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) during landing;
3. Mid Air Collision- (MAC);
4. Controlled Flight into Terrain- (CFIT); and
5. Runway Incursion- (RI)

2.3 In addition to this, safety issues have been identified and mapped to their respective accident outcomes.

Organizational issues**States' Safety Oversight Capabilities**

2.4 USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76,8 %, which is above the world average 69.68% % (as of 10 August 2024). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60.

2.5 All eight areas and CEs have an EI above 60%. However, the areas of AIG and ANS and CE4, CE7, and CE8 still need more improvement. 6 areas and 5 critical elements are above the target of 70% EI.

2.6 Moreover, the effective implementation in certification, surveillance, and resolution of Safety concerns need to be improved.

Safety Management

2.7 States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to fully implement SSPs according to Annex 19; States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 78, 59%.

2.8 Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as

one of the top Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). In connection with this, the RSC/7 endorsed the MID Region Safety Management Implementation Roadmap and the establishment of the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT) to support MID States with the implementation of the SSP in an effective and efficient way. The SMIT handbook endorsed by the RASG-MID/9.

2.9 In addition, the development of National Aviation Safety plan (NASP) is one of the MID region safety priorities and so far, nine (9) States had developed and shared an approved copies of their NASPs with ICAO MID Office.

2.10 In line with the Safety Strategic Objective of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 2023-2025 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. It also provides a framework in which regional and national aviation safety plans (RASPs and NASPs) are developed and implemented.

2.11 The States NASP should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety issues. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate).

Human Factors and Human Personnel

2.12 As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. CRM has been identified as most important human factors issue in the domain of commercial air transport and safety actions would be identified and developed.

Competence of Personnel

2.13 Availability of well-trained and competent aviation personnel is paramount to the safety and resilience of the aviation industry. Some of States in MID Region has a mature and detailed regulatory framework in place to ensure proper training, licensing, adequacy of training devices and oversight. Nevertheless, several factors are challenging this mature framework: new technologies and increasing automation are changing the safety needs for aviation personnel and new training devices are emerging. New aircraft types and technological advancements in virtual reality/artificial intelligence are revolutionizing pilot training altogether.

Manage Risk Interdependencies

2.14 The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that safety, security, health safety and other risks can no longer be managed in isolation. The aviation community has realized that continuing to develop tools and specific guidance for each situation and for each domain affected by transversal risks may delay not only the implementation of mitigation measures, but also the development of an enabling framework to support integrated, collaborative risk management.

Cybersecurity Risks

2.15 The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalization. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardized manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from

experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organizations with malicious intent.

Security Risks with an impact on Aviation Safety

The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport security, aircraft security or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider potential impacts on aviation safety. States should consider where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist.

2.16 Therefore, an integrated approach to the management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities would bring benefits such as a complete overview of risks, a better sharing of security information and the closure of gaps in the security system while focusing on increasing the overall level of safety. Consequently, this would allow ensuring synergies where security measures can have an impact on safety and vice versa; thereby avoiding incompatible actions and strengthening the overall safety and security of civil aviation.

Risks arising from conflict zones

2.17 Some fatal accidents on conflicted areas raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. It's important that states, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civil flights.

Aviation Health Safety (AHS) Risks

2.18 The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the harmonization of health policies affecting aviation, and in particular in the commercial Air Transport (CAT) domain, has become an important topic to help overcome the pandemic. The objective is to minimize the impact of health safety threats in CAT. Health safety threats should be included in the management of risk interdependencies.

2.19 COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we will be faced with. It is crucial to continue supporting the MID Region aviation industry competitiveness by offering the safest aircraft interior environment to reduce the risk of disease transmission between continents and States, restore public trust and facilitate future responses to events of similar nature.

GNSS Interference and spoofing Risks

2.20 The analysis utilized data from the Flight Data Exchange (FDX) showed a total of 46444 'GPS signal in the MENA region from January 2023 to December 2023 with the rate of 98.76 compared to global average of 30.19 per cent.

2.21 To bring attention to the critical issue of GNSS interference and spoofing, and to foster discussions on the management of GNSS vulnerabilities and potential mitigation measures against GNSS RFI, ICAO convened the ICAO EUR/MID Radio Navigation Symposium from 6 to 8 February 2024 in, Turkey and several recommendations have been adopted by the meeting.

Interference with Radio Altimeter

2.22 There is a major risk that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band will cause harmful interference to radar altimeters on all types of civil aircraft- including commercial transport airplanes; business, regional, and general aviation airplanes; and both transport and general

aviation helicopters. If there is no proper mitigation, this risk has the potential for broad impacts to aviation operations in the United States as well as in other regions where the 5G network is being implemented next to the 4.2-4.4 GHz frequency band.

Emerging Issues

2.23 Emerging issues are risks that might impact Safety in the future, these may include a possible new technology, a potential public policy, a new concept, business model or idea that, while perhaps an outlier today, could mature and develop into a critical mainstream issue in the future or become a major trend in its own right.

- Advanced Air Mobility and New Entrants including UAS and eVTOL

2.24 The meeting was apprised with appreciation of the development of the 13th MID-ASR Edition and agreed that the MID Office, in coordination with the ASRG Chairpersons, finalize the 13th MID-ASR to be presented to the RASG-MID/11 for endorsement.

2.25 The meeting noted with appreciation that IATA will share the NMACs data analysis for MID Region to support the development of safety enhancement initiatives.

Sharing of Safety Information and Development of the 13th MID Annual Safety Report

2.26 The subject was addressed in WP/2 and PPT/1 presented by the Secretariat. The meeting reiterated the importance of sharing the occurrences and their respective safety analysis by the States in order to produce an improved annual safety report in the future. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the following Draft Conclusion:

DRAFT CONCLUSION 6/1: SHARING OF SAFETY DATA ANALYSIS

*In respect of the next MID ASR edition, States are encouraged to provide necessary safety information and safety analysis to the ICAO MID Office, by May 2024 related to each occurrence category in **Appendix 2C** for the past 5 years (2020– 2024) and using the templates in **Appendix 2D** and **Appendix 2E**. The Draft of the 14th edition of the MID ASR will be presented to the ASRG/7 meeting for review.*

2.27 The meeting highlighted the main Challenge facing the ASRG for the development of the ASRs, in particular:

- Limited sharing of safety information including safety analysis by the States.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 3: FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME

4.1 The subject was addressed in WP/4 presented by the Secretariat.

4.2 The meeting agreed that the ASRG/7 meeting be tentatively scheduled to be held on October 2024 and the exact dates and venue will be coordinated with Chairperson.

-END-

APPENDICES

FOLLOW-UP ACTION PLAN ON RASG-MID/11 CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
C. 11/1	<p>12TH ASR</p> <p>That, the Twelfth MID Annual Safety Report is endorsed and be posted on the ICAO MID Website.</p>	<p>Sharing the final 12th MID-ASR for the period 2018-2022 with identified MID Region safety priorities and an update on safety performance</p>	<p>MID-ASR 12th Edition published on the ICAO website</p>	<p>RASG-MID/11</p>	<p>April 2024</p>	<p>Completed</p>
C. 11/2	<p>SHARING OF SAFETY DATA ANALYSIS</p> <p>In respect of the next MID ASR edition, States are encouraged to provide necessary safety information and safety data analysis to the ICAO MID Office, by May 2024 related to each occurrence category in Appendix 4B for the past 5 years (2019– 2023) and using the templates in Appendix 4C and Appendix 4D. The Draft of the 13th edition of the MID ASR will be presented to the ASRG/6 meeting for review.</p>	<p>Collection of safety data analysis for a Harmonized database</p>	<p>Safety Data Analysis for development of ASR</p>	<p>States</p>	<p>April 2024</p>	<p>Completed</p> <p>SL Ref: ME 4-24/059 dated 4 April 2024</p>
C.11/3	<p>GNSS INTERFERENCE AND SPOOFING</p> <p>That,</p> <p>a) ICAO with the support of states and IATA to establish a regionally determined minimum operational network (MON) of conventional navigation aids for use in case of GNSS interference /Spoofing;</p> <p>b) States be urged to develop mitigation measures to be used in case of GNSS interference;</p>	<p>Definition of the minimum operational network (MON) of conventional navigation aids for use in case of GNSS interference/Spoofing.</p> <p>Lack of mitigation</p>	<p>minimum operational network (MON) of conventional navigation aids for use in case of GNSS interference/Spoofing.</p> <p>Proposed mitigation</p>	<p>ICAO, IATA and States</p> <p>States</p>	<p>Tentatively</p> <p>October 2024</p>	<p>Actioned</p> <p>(To be revised actioned during the CNS SG/13)</p>

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
	<p>c) States to maintain adequate infrastructure to enable aircraft operators use of conventional navigation aids as appropriate during GNSS RFI or Spoofing;</p> <p>d) Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to provide further guidance and information on the effects and mitigations of GNSS RFI (including interference, jamming and spoofing) from the perspective of aircraft equipment;</p> <p>e) States to foster Civil-military coordination and cooperation; and</p> <p>f) ICAO with the support of States, ACAO, IATA and IFALPA to amend RASG-MID Safety Advisory – 14 including the update of the GNSS RFI statistics and to include GNSS spoofing effect and mitigation measures.</p>	<p>measures to be used in case of GNSS interference.</p> <p>Operations Continuity dung GNSS RFI or Spoofing</p> <p>Lack of coordination with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)</p> <p>Lack of coordination with the Military</p> <p>Amendment of the current RSA 14</p>	<p>measures to be used in case of GNSS interference.</p> <p>Alternatives ensuring Operations Continuity dung GNSS RFI or Spoofing</p> <p>Establishment of coordination with OEMs</p> <p>Establishment of coordination with the Military side</p> <p>Amended RSA 14</p>	<p>States</p> <p>States</p> <p>States</p> <p>ACAO, ICAO, IATA, IFALPA.</p>		
C. 11/4	<p>IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS ON THE SAFETY ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVES (SEIs)</p> <p>That,</p> <p>a) The implementation progress of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and safety actions included in the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition at Appendix 4G is endorsed; and</p> <p>b) States, international organizations and industry are urged to support the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition activities including SEIs and safety actions</p>	<p>support the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition activities including SEIs and safety actions</p>	<p>Implementation of SEIs and safety actions</p>	<p>States, organizations, and industry</p>	<p>April 2024</p>	<p>Ongoing</p>
C. 11/5	<p>CARRIAGE AND TRANSPORT OF LITHIUM BATTERIES GUIDANCE MATERIAL</p>	<p>Continuous reduction of incidents related to</p>	<p>Circulate GM material to all states</p>	<p>ICAO & IATA</p>	<p>May 2024</p>	<p>Completed.</p> <p>Email sent on 28 May 2024</p>

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
	That, the guidance material document on the carriage and transport of lithium batteries at Appendices 4H & 4I is endorsed.	Lithium batteries issues				
C. 11/6	<p>DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (NASP) IN MID STATES</p> <p>That, States be:</p> <p>a) urged to develop and implement the NASP in line with the GASP and MID-RASP, if not yet done so;</p> <p>b) encouraged to share the latest version of their NASPs with ICAO HQ and ICAO Regional MID office for posting on the GASP public website;</p> <p>c) encouraged to continue to use existing ICAO guidance material and tools to implement their NASPs;</p> <p>d) encouraged to request assistance from the ICAO MID Regional Office related to the development of their NASPs including the conduct of assistance missions and/or customized NASP Workshop for each State; and</p> <p>e) encouraged to share their experiences related to the development of their NASPs during the SEIG meetings and/or Regional NASP Workshop to be organized by the ICAO MID Regional Office in 2025.</p>	Compliance with Assembly Resolution A40-1	State Letter	ICAO	April 2024	<p>Ongoing</p> <p><i>SL Ref: ME 4-24/062 dated 8 April 2024</i></p> <p><i>Regional NASP workshop to be conducted Oct 2024</i></p>
C. 11/7	<p>DEVELOPMENT OF SSP IN MID STATES</p> <p>That, States be:</p> <p>a. encouraged to effectively implement their State Safety Programme in a timely manner, and to strengthen the</p>	Support States with the development and Implementation	MID States SSP development	ICAO	April 2024	<p>Ongoing</p> <p><i>SSP workshops being conducted.</i></p>

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
	<p>implementation of safety management systems in their aviation industry;</p> <p>b. encouraged to request assistance from the ICAO MID Regional Office related to the development and implementation of their SSPs including the conduct of assistance missions and/or customized SSP implementation and Safety Risk Management Workshops for each State;</p> <p>c. encouraged to support the SMIT activities;</p> <p>d. share their experiences on the development of their SSPs during the SEIG meetings; and</p> <p>e. encouraged to share their latest version of SSP manuals with ICAO MID Office.</p>	<p>of SSP</p>				
C. 11/8	<p>ANONYMOUS DATASET COLLECTION FOR AERODROMES SAFETY</p> <p>That, in order to promote safety and improve the effectiveness of the corrective action process at the regional level, MID States and concerned Stakeholders are urged to:</p> <p>a) endorse the Template listing of Minimum Reporting Areas of non-compliance to be reported, as presented at Appendix 4K, to ICAO MID Office for consolidation and follow-up actions, and</p> <p>b) nominate a Main/National Focal Point responsible for the anonymous communication of these datasets using the Template.</p>	<p>promote safety and improve the effectiveness of the corrective action process at the regional level, MID States and concerned Stakeholders</p>	<p>Anonymous Dataset Collection for Aerodromes Safety</p>	<p>States</p>	<p>May 2024</p>	<p>On-going</p> <p>(Finalizing the collection of the National Focal Points contacts)</p>

FOLLOW-UP ACTION PLAN ON MIDANPIRG/21 & RASG-MID/11 CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
C. 1	<p>PUBLISHING OF THE NASP</p> <p>That, States, be urged to publish their NASP and to provide it to ICAO HQ and ICAO MID Office for posting on the ICAO NASP Library website (www.icao.int/nasplibrary).</p>	Compliance with Assembly Resolution A40-1	State Letter	States	April 2024	<p>Completed</p> <p>SL Ref: ME 4-24/062 dated 8 April 2024</p>
C. 2	<p>MENA ACRM</p> <p>That States, States be encouraged to sign the MENA AIG Regional Cooperation Mechanism (MENA ARCM) MoU, if not yet done.</p>	Enhancement of cooperation among MENA States in the provision of AIG area	Sign the MoU to support States in AIG area	States	May 2024	<p>Actioned</p> <p>Discussed during MENA ARCM/5 meeting</p>
D. 3	<p>ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MID REGION ACDM TASK FORCE (MID ACDM-TF)</p> <p>That the MID Region Airport Collaborative Decision-Making Task Force (MID ACDM-TF) be established, subject to review and confirmation of ASPG/6, in accordance with the Terms of Reference at Appendix 2A.</p>	Lack of efficient interface between the CAAs and the Server Providers	MID ACDM-TF (Confirmed by ASPIG/6)	ICAO Partners and States	May 2024	<p>Actioned</p> <p>Further coordination to be made with the ICAO Partners the set the ACDM TF composition</p>
C. 4	<p>RISKS RELATED TO ALTIMETER SETTING ERRORS DURING APV BARO-VNAV AND NON-PRECISION APPROACH OPERATIONS</p> <p>That, ICAO MID promotes the EUR OPS BULETIN at Appendix 3B on Risks related to altimeter setting errors during APV Baro-VNAV and non-precision approach operations and ensures the widespread dissemination of this bulletin among member States.</p>	To sensitizing the MID aviation community to vulnerabilities of Baro-VNAV approaches, in particular their dependence on correct altimeter setting	State Letter	States	June 2024	<p>Completed.</p> <p>ICAO MID has disseminated the EUR OPS Bulletin 2023_001 to all of its Member States by means of State Letter</p>

LIST OF OCCURRENCE CATEGORIES TAXONOMY

Scope: State of Occurrence

The data to be collected be based on scheduled commercial operations involving aircraft having a Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) above 5700 kg.

Occurrence Category	ADREP/CICTT taxonomy	Remarks
Runway Excursion (RE)	Veer off or overrun off the runway surface.	
Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC)	Any landing or take-off involving abnormal runway or landing surface contact.	
Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I)	Loss of Control while, or deviation from intended flight path, in flight.	
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)	Inflight collision or near collision with terrain, water, or obstacles without indication of loss of control.	
MID Air Collision (MAC)/ NMACs	Airprox/TCAS Alerts, Loss of separation as well as NMAC or collisions between aircraft inflight.	
Fire/Smoke (F-NI)	Fire or smoke in or on the aircraft, in flight, or on the ground, which is not the result of impact.	
Runway Incursion (RI)	Any occurrence at aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for landing and takeoff of aircraft.	
System Component Failure –Non-Power Plant (SCF-NP)	Failure or malfunction of an aircraft system or component other than the power plant.	
Turbulence Encounter (TURB)	In-flight turbulence encounter.	
Birdstrike (BIRD)	Occurrences involving collisions/near collisions with bird(s).	
Navigation Errors (NAV)	Occurrences involving the incorrect navigation of aircraft on the ground or in the air	

System Component Failure- Power Plant (SCF-PP)	Failure or malfunction of an aircraft system or components related to the power plant.	
Security related (SEC)	Criminal/Security acts which result in accidents or incidents (per Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation).	
Wind shear	Flight into wind shear or thunderstorm	

NB: States may share any other occurrence category or national safety concern.

10	BIRD															
11	Navigation Errors (NAV)															
12	System Component Failure- Power Plant (SCF-PP)															
13	Security related (SEC)															
14	Wind shear															

States should provide the number of accident, serious incidents, and incidents related to each category mentioned in the template above for the past five years (2020-2024)

Scope: State of Occurrence

2- Brief- Safety data Analysis (Root-cause analysis, Trends, Low probability high consequence (LPHC) events if any, etc.)

3- Identified Top Five safety risks

4- Safety mitigations/Recommendations

11	Navigation Errors (NAV)															
12	System Component Failure-Power Plant (SCF-PP)															
13	Security related (SEC)															
14	Wind shear															

States should provide the number of accident, serious incidents, and incidents related to each category mentioned in the template above for the past five years (2020-2024)

Scope: State of Occurrence

2- Brief- Safety data Analysis (Root-cause analysis, Trends, Low probability high consequence (LPHC) events if any, etc.)

3- Identified Top Five safety risks

4- Safety mitigations/Recommendations

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Sixth Meeting of the Annual Safety Report Group (ASRG/6)

State / Organization		Registration First Name	Registration Last Name	Job title
Bahrain	Bahrain CAA	Ebtisam	Mohamed	Sr. Civil Engineer
Bahrain	Bahrain CAA	Leena	Alkooheji	Chief, Airport & Air Navigation Safety Regulation - AVSEC PM
Bahrain	Bahrain CAA	MOHAMED	ALMARZOUQI	Senior Air Navigation Audit Specialist
Iran	CAA	Jaber	Goodarzi	Deputy Director of Safety and Quality Assurance
Iran	CAA	zeynab	roshani	Aircraft Accident Investigator
Iran	CAA	Hassan	Rezaeifar	Director of Aircraft Accident Investigation Board
Iraq	CAA	THAER	SALIM	CNS Inspector
Jordan	Jordan CARC	Rawan	Alnaimat	Chief of Operations Auditing Division
Jordan	Jordan CARC	Abier	Mahmoud	Aviation Safety Auditor
Jordan	Jordan CARC	DAFI	ELRYALAT	Aircraft Accident Investigator
Jordan	Jordan CARC	Mohammad	Banyismail	Aircraft accident Investigator
Jordan	Jordan CARC	abdallah	alsamarat	investigation expert
Oman	Oman CAA	Rawya	Al Adawi	Safety Regulations Director, Oman NCMC
Oman	Oman CAA	Hilal	AL Hatmitmi	Director, Flight Safety
Oman	Oman CAA	ramzi	smirani	Ground Operations Inspector
Oman	Oman CAA	Christopher	Gundu	Flight Operations Inspector
Oman	Oman CAA	OTHMAN	MAT TAIB	SENIOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS INSPECTOR
Oman	Oman CAA	Michael	Koroma	Flight Operations Inspector
Oman	Oman CAA	Ashish	Kapoor	Flight Operations Inspector
Oman	Oman CAA	Mohammad	Al-Husban	Airworthiness Inspector
Oman	Oman CAA	Mohammadhadi	Sayyadnezhad	Airworthiness Inspector

Attachment A

Oman	Oman CAA	Giorgio	Vanno Antonelli	ICAO Flight Operations Expert
Oman	Oman CAA	Dr. Aisha	Al Balushi	Medical Assessor
Oman	Oman CAA	Shatha	Al Shuaibi	Aviation Safety Specialist
Oman	Oman CAA	said	alnaamani	AAI
Oman	Oman CAA	Khalifa Mohammed Salim	Al-Abdali	Capt
Oman	Oman CAA	Mohammad	Hashmi	FOI
Oman	Oman CAA	Lasitha	Chathuranga	Airworthiness Inspector
Oman	Oman Transport Safety Bureau	ZIYANA	AL SAID	Head of Air Accident Investigation Section
Oman	Oman Transport Safety Bureau	Eng. Sulaiman	Al Rashdi	AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATOR
QATAR	QCAA	Alvaro	Neves	Head of QAAI
QATAR	QCAA	Erdal	YESILBAS	Acting Head of Safety and Risk Management Section
QATAR	QCAA	Awad	Naimat	Airworthiness Inspector
QATAR	QCAA	Ahsan	Zahid	Aviation Safety Analyst- Safety & Risk Mangt Section, Air Safety Dept.
Saudi Arabia	GACA	Mohammad	Alsharif	Studies and Reports Specialist
Saudi Arabia	GACA	ABDULLAH	AL-DUHAYNAH	Senior Risk Specialist
Saudi Arabia	GACA	Mohammed	Aldhahri	Director, Safety Analysis
Saudi Arabia	GACA	MESHAL	ALZHRANI	Safety Analyst
Saudi Arabia	GACA	Hisham	Aldraiby	Prevention Specialist

Attachment A

UAE	GCAA	Rashed	Belrumaitha	Senior Manager - Strategic safety & performance
UAE	GCAA	fatema	alblooshi	Specialist strategic safety and performance
UAE	GCAA	Amna	Alraeesi	Specialist - Strategic Safety & Performance
FAA	USA/NAM	Ann	Moore	Air Traffic Organization Safety
FAA	USA - FAA	Christina	Clausnitzer	Analyst
Boeing	United Arab Emirates	Ahsan	Naseer	Manager Aviation Safety Strategies
IATA	IATA	Jehad Mohd	Faqir	Head Regional Safety Africa & Middle East