



ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization  
North American, Central American and Caribbean Office

WORKING PAPER

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**Twelfth North American, Central American and Caribbean Directors of Civil Aviation Meeting  
(NACC/DCA/12)**

Placencia, Stann Creek District, Belize, 9-11 July 2024

**Agenda Item 3: Aviation Security (AVSEC) and Facilitation (FAL)**

**ONE STOP SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS – THIRD-PARTY IMPLICATIONS AND THE CRITICALITY OF  
INFORMATION SHARING**

(Presented by United States)

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

As One-Stop Security (OSS) arrangements become more prevalent, the potential for increased security vulnerabilities and consequent shifting of risk within the civil aviation ecosystem also grows. For OSS to truly enhance global and regional aviation security, States involved in such arrangements must ensure the highest levels of security are implemented and maintained over time, to account for changes in threat, innovations in aviation security practices, and developments in advanced screening technologies. Likewise, an essential part of achieving this objective is the consistent sharing of relevant OSS arrangement information with all impacted States and stakeholders.

<b>Action:</b>	The Meeting is invited to affirm that and encourage the sharing of relevant information between States engaged in OSS arrangements and those impacted, as essential to minimize the possibility of creating new vulnerabilities in the global aviation security system and to allow States to appropriately assess risks to their respective national civil aviation systems and operations.
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<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Security &amp; Facilitation</li></ul>
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<i>References:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• ICAO document: <a href="#">Recognizing the Equivalence of Security Measures – One Stop Security (2023)</a></li></ul>
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**1. Introduction**

1.1 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) promotes the benefits of OSS arrangements that can lead to the elimination of unnecessary duplication of security controls and increase the global sustainability of the aviation security system, and provide for a more straightforward transfer process for passengers and their belongings resulting in shorter connections, fewer missed connections and fewer missing bags at destination.<sup>1</sup> However, OSS arrangements can inadvertently increase security

<sup>1</sup> ICAO Document: “Recognizing the Equivalence of Security Measures – One Stop Security” (2023), available at <https://www.icao.int/Security/SFP/Pages/OSS.aspx>.

vulnerabilities and consequently shift risk within the civil aviation ecosystem. For example, if/when reduced security measures achieved through an OSS arrangement conflict with requirements placed on airports and/or air carriers serving the same passengers, or set forth in bilateral air service agreements, additional measures may need to be placed on the operators to compensate for the newly-created security gap. This undermines the potential facilitation benefits that OSS arrangements can provide.

## **2. Discussion**

2.1 While OSS arrangements (whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral) are intended to increase the sustainability of the aviation security system, enhance passenger experiences, and increase efficiencies in aviation travel, they also have the potential to subject the aviation system to unintended vulnerabilities or additional risk if they are implemented without sufficient coordination and consideration.<sup>2</sup> Such coordination and consideration must include not only the States that are party to an OSS arrangement, but also the receiving States, as well as the stakeholders (i.e., airport operators and air carriers) that are expected to facilitate the transfer/transit of those passengers and their baggage under the OSS arrangement. This is essential as security measures that would otherwise be carried out at the transfer airport, to include measures required by receiving States, would be eliminated under the OSS framework.

2.2 States that are party to an OSS arrangement will know the details of each other's systems on which equivalency is established, including the basis on which security measures are identified as duplicative and are subsequently eliminated. As recently recognized by the 35<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Aviation Security Panel of Experts as well as the Twelfth Meeting of the ICAO/LACAC NAM/CAR and SAM Aviation Security and Facilitation Regional Group, it is equally imperative to share relevant aviation security information between States engaged in OSS arrangements and impacted States that are not parties to OSS arrangements, as well as ensure the consultation of stakeholders from the outset, in order to minimize the possibility of creating new vulnerabilities or other operational impacts. This will also allow States that are not parties to the OSS arrangement, but that are on the receiving end of it, to conduct their own risk assessment for the covered operations bound for their territory, given the changed security posture at the last point of departure, and to manage that risk as they deem appropriate.

2.3 This relevant aviation security information can include the specific requirements and validation processes that have been established to support OSS arrangements, and the bases on which equivalency was determined, including security equipment in use at all locations covered by the arrangement; the States' continuous validation, monitoring, and quality control plans; as well as the States' plans for continuing enhancements and evolution of their security systems (to include their security equipment and capital investment plans, as well as contingency plans, for the affected OSS locations). Understanding this information will be essential to ensuring that the OSS arrangement truly enhances global and regional aviation security, rather than unintentionally diminishing it, creating a static security posture, or unknowingly shifting the risk to receiving States and the affected operators.

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, "Benefits and Challenges of One-Stop Security" at page 12.

**3. Conclusion**

3.1 For OSS to truly enhance global and regional aviation security, States involved in such arrangements must ensure the highest levels of security are implemented and maintained over time to account for changes in threat, innovations in aviation security practices, and developments in advanced screening technologies. Likewise, an essential part of achieving this objective is the proactive and consistent sharing of relevant OSS arrangement information with all impacted States and stakeholders. When OSS arrangement information is not shared with all affected parties, ideally well in advance of implementation, it can lead to missed opportunities to resolve roadblocks that might otherwise complicate the implementation of the arrangement and/or result in unexpected costs and demands for additional resources.

**4. Action by the Meeting**

4.1 The Meeting is invited to affirm that and encourage the sharing of relevant information between States and stakeholders engaged in or impacted by OSS arrangements is essential to minimize the possibility of creating new vulnerabilities in the global aviation security system and to allow States to appropriately assess risks to their respective national civil aviation systems.